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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/1860/1834

Title: Probabilistic equilibria for evolutionarily stable strategies
Authors: McCain, Roger A.
Issue Date: Feb-2007
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Citation: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(1): pp. 34-36.
Abstract: This comment suggest that an equilibrium framework may be retained, in an evolutionary model such as Gintis’ and with far more realistic results, if rationality is relaxed in a slightly different way than he proposes: decisions are assumed to be related to rewards probabilistically, rather than with certainty. This relaxed concept of rationality gives rise to probabilistic equilibria.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/1860/1834
Appears in Collections:Faculty Research and Publications (Economics & International Business)

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